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This  paper  presents  a fully  specified  model  of  long-run  growth  in 
which  knowledge  is assumed  to be an input  in production  that has 
increasing  marginal  productivity.  It is essentially  a competitive  equi- 
librium model  with endogenous  technological  change.  In contrast to 
models based on diminishing  returns, growth rates can be increasing 
over  time,  the effects  of small disturbances  can be amplified  by the 
actions of private agents,  and large countries  may always grow faster 
than small countries.  Long-run  evidence  is offered  in support  of the 
empirical  relevance  of  these  possibilities. 
I.  Introduction 
Because  of  its  simplicity,  the  aggregate  growth  model  analyzed  by 
Ramsey (1928),  Cass (1965),  and  Koopmans  (1965)  continues  to form 
the  basis for  much  of  the  intuition  economists  have  about  long-run 
growth.  The  rate of  return  on  investment  and  the rate of  growth of 
per capita output  are expected  to be decreasing  functions  of the level 
of the per capita capital stock. Over time, wage rates and capital-labor 
ratios  across  different  countries  are  expected  to  converge.  Conse- 
quently,  initial conditions  or current  disturbances  have  no  long-run 
effect  on the level of output  and consumption.  For example,  an exog- 
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enous  reduction  in the  stock of  capital in a given  country  will cause 
prices for capital assets to increase and will therefore  induce an offset- 
ting  increase  in investment.  In the absence  of  technological  change, 
per capita output  should  converge  to a steady-state value with no per 
capita  growth.  All  these  presumptions  follow  directly  from  the  as- 
sumption  of  diminishing  returns  to per capita capital in the  produc- 
tion of  per capita output. 
The  model  proposed  here  offers  an  alternative  view of  long-run 
prospects for growth.  In a fully specified competitive  equilibrium,  per 
capita output  can grow without bound,  possibly at a rate that is mono- 
tonically increasing  over time. The  rate of investment  and the rate of 
return on capital may increase  rather than decrease  with increases in 
the capital stock. The  level of per capita output  in different  countries 
need  not converge;  growth  may be  persistently  slower  in less devel- 
oped  countries  and may even  fail to take place at all. These  results do 
not depend  on any kind of exogenously  specified  technical change  or 
differences  between  countries.  Preferences  and  the  technology  are 
stationary and  identical.  Even the  size of  the  population  can be held 
constant. What is crucial for all of these results is a departure  from the 
usual assumption  of  diminishing  returns. 
While exogenous  technological  change  is ruled out, the model here 
can be viewed  as an equilibrium  model  of  endogenous  technological 
change  in which long-run  growth is driven primarily by the accumula- 
tion  of  knowledge  by  forward-looking,  profit-maximizing  agents. 
This  focus on knowledge  as the basic form of capital suggests  natural 
changes  in the formulation  of the standard aggregate  growth  model. 
In contrast to physical capital that can be produced  one  for one  from 
forgone  output,  new  knowledge  is assumed  to  be  the  product  of  a 
research technology  that exhibits  diminishing  returns.  That  is, given 
the  stock of  knowledge  at a point  in time,  doubling  the  inputs  into 
research will not double  the amount  of new knowledge  produced.  In 
addition,  investment  in knowledge  suggests a natural externality.  The 
creation of  new knowledge  by one  firm is assumed  to have a positive 
external  effect  on  the  production  possibilities  of other  firms because 
knowledge  cannot  be perfectly  patented  or kept secret.  Most impor- 
tant, production  of  consumption  goods  as a function  of  the stock of 
knowledge  and  other  inputs  exhibits  increasing  returns;  more  pre- 
cisely, knowledge  may have an increasing  marginal  product.  In con- 
trast to models  in which capital exhibits diminishing  marginal produc- 
tivity, knowledge  will grow without bound.  Even if all other inputs are 
held constant,  it will not be optimal  to stop at some steady state where 
knowledge  is constant  and  no  new research  is undertaken. 
These  three elements-externalities,  increasing  returns in the pro- 
duction  of  output,  and  decreasing  returns  in the  production  of  new 1004  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
knowledge-combine  to produce  a well-specified  competitive  equilib- 
rium model  of  growth.  Despite  the  presence  of  increasing  returns,  a 
competitive  equilibrium  with externalities  will exist. This  equilibrium 
is not Pareto optimal,  but it is the outcome  of a well-behaved  positive 
model and is capable of explaining  historical growth in the absence of 
government  intervention.  The  presence  of  the externalities  is essen- 
tial for  the  existence  of  an  equilibrium.  Diminishing  returns  in  the 
production  of  knowledge  are  required  to  ensure  that consumption 
and utility do not grow too fast. But the key feature  in the reversal of 
the  standard  results  about  growth  is  the  assumption  of  increasing 
rather than decreasing  marginal productivity  of the intangible  capital 
good  knowledge. 
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  II traces briefly the his- 
tory of the idea that increasing  returns are important  to the explana- 
tion  of  long-run  growth  and  describes  some  of  the  conceptual 
difficulties  that impeded  progress  toward a formal  model  that relied 
on increasing  returns.  Section  III presents  empirical evidence  in sup- 
port  of  the  model  proposed  here.  Section  IV  presents  a  stripped- 
down,  two-period  version  of  the  model  that illustrates  the  tools that 
are used  to analyze  an equilibrium  with externalities  and  increasing 
returns.  Section  V presents  the  analysis of  the  infinite-horizon,  con- 
tinuous-time  version  of the  model,  characterizing  the social optimum 
and the competitive  equilibrium,  both with and without optimal taxes. 
The  primary motivation  for the choice  of continuous  time and the 
restriction  to a single  state variable is the ease with which qualitative 
results  can  be  derived  using  the  geometry  of  the  phase  plane.  In 
particular,  once  functional  forms  for  production  and  preferences 
have been  specified,  useful  qualitative information  about the dynam- 
ics of  the  social optimum  or the  suboptimal  competitive  equilibrium 
can  be  extracted  using  simple  algebra.  Section  VI  presents  several 
examples  that  illustrate  the  extent  to  which  conventional  presump- 
tions about growth  rates, asset prices, and cross-country  comparisons 
may be reversed  in this kind of  economy. 
II.  Historical  Origins  and  Relation  to Earlier  Work 
The  idea  that  increasing  returns  are  central  to  the  explanation  of 
long-run  growth  is at least  as old  as Adam  Smith's story of  the  pin 
factory.  With the  introduction  by Alfred  Marshall of  the  distinction 
between  internal and external  economies,  it appeared  that this expla- 
nation could  be given  a consistent,  competitive  equilibrium  interpre- 
tation. The  most  prominent  such attempt  was made by Allyn Young 
in his  1928  presidential  address  to the  Economics  and  Statistics sec- 
tion  of  the  British  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science INCREASING  RETURNS  1005 
(Young  1969),  Subsequent  economists  (e.g.,  Hicks  1960;  Kaldor 
1981) have credited  Young  with a fundamental  insight about growth, 
but because of the verbal nature of his argument  and the difficulty of 
formulating  explicit  dynamic  models,  no  formal  model  embodying 
that insight  was developed. 
Because  of  the technical  difficulties  presented  by dynamic  models, 
Marshall's concept  of increasing  returns that are external  to a firm but 
internal  to an industry  was most  widely  used  in static models,  espe- 
cially in the field of international  trade. In the  1920s the logical consis- 
tency and relevance  of these  models  began to be seriously challenged, 
in particular by Frank Knight,  who had been  a student  of Young's at 
Cornell.'  Subsequent  work  demonstrated  that  it is possible  to  con- 
struct consistent,  general  equilibrium  models  with  perfect  competi- 
tion,  increasing  returns,  and  externalities  (see,  e.g.,  Chipman  1970). 
Yet Knight was at least partially correct  in objecting  that the concept 
of  increasing  returns  that  are  external  to  the  firm  was vacuous,  an 
"empty economic  box" (Knight  1925). Following Smith, Marshall, and 
Young,  most authors justified  the existence  of increasing  returns on 
the  basis of  increasing  specialization  and  the  division  of  labor.  It is 
now clear that these changes  in the organization  of production  cannot 
be  rigorously  treated  as  technological  externalities.  Formally,  in- 
creased  specialization  opens  new markets and introduces  new goods. 
All producers  in  the  industry  may benefit  from  the  introduction  of 
these  goods,  but thev  are goods,  not technological  externalities.2 
Despite  the objections  raised by Knight, static models  of increasing 
returns  with  externalities  have  been  widely  used  in  international 
trade.  Typically,  firm output  is simply  assumed  to be increasing,  or 
unit  cost  decreasing,  in  aggregate  industry  output.  See  Helpman 
(1984)  for  a recent  survey.  Renewed  interest  in  dynamic  models  of 
growth driven by increasing  returns  was sparked  in the  1960s follow- 
ing the publication  of Arrow's (1962)  paper on learning  by doing.  In 
his model,  the productivity  of a given firm is assumed  to be an increas- 
ing  function  of  cumulative  aggregate  investment  for  the  industry. 
Avoiding  the issues of specialization  and the division  of labor, Arrow 
argued  that increasing  returns arise because new knowledge  is discov- 
ered as investment  and production  take place. The  increasing returns 
were  external  to  individual  firms  because  such  knowledge  became 
publicly known. 
To  formalize  his model,  Arrow had to face two problems  that arise 
l  For an account  of  the  development  of  Young's  ideas  and  of  his correspondence 
with  Knight.  see  Blitch  (1983). 
2For  a treatment  of  increasing  returns  based  on  specialization,  see  Ethier  (1982). 
Although  the model  there is essentially  static, it demonstrates  how specialization can be 
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in  any  optimizing  model  of  growth  in  the  presence  of  increasing 
returns.  The  first, familiar from static models,  concerns  the existence 
of a competitive  equilibrium;  as is now clear, if the increasing  returns 
are external  to the  firm, an equilibrium  can exist.  The  second  prob- 
lem, unique  to dynamic  optimizing  models,  concerns  the existence  of 
a social optimum  and  the  finiteness  of  objective  functions.  In a stan- 
dard  optimizing  growth  model  that  maximizes  a discounted  sum  or 
integral  over  an infinite  horizon,  the  presence  of  increasing  returns 
raises the possibility that feasible consumption  paths may grow so fast 
that the objective  function  is not finite.  An optimum  can fail to exist 
even  in the  sense  of  an overtaking  criterion.  In the  model  of  Arrow 
and its elaborations  by Levhari (1966a,  1966b) and Sheshinski  (1967), 
this  difficulty  is avoided  by  assuming  that  output  as  a  function  of 
capital and labor exhibits  increasing  returns to scale but that the mar- 
ginal  product  of capital is diminishing  given  a fixed  supply  of  labor. 
As  a  result,  the  rate  of  growth  of  output  is limited  by  the  rate  of 
growth  of  the  labor  force.  Interpreted  as  an  aggregate  model  of 
growth (rather than as a model of a specific industry), this model leads 
to the empirically  questionable  implication  that the rate of growth of 
per capita output  is a monotonically  increasing  function  of the rate of 
growth of the population.  Like conventional  models  with diminishing 
returns,  it predicts  that the rate of growth  in per capita consumption 
must go  to zero  in an economy  with zero  population  growth. 
The  model  proposed  here  departs  from  both  the  Ramsey-Cass- 
Koopmans  model  and the Arrow model  by assuming  that knowledge 
is a capital good  with an increasing  marginal  product.  Production  of 
the consumption  good  is assumed  to be globally convex,  not concave, 
as a function  of  stock  of  knowledge  when  all other  inputs  are  held 
constant.  A  finite-valued  social  optimum  is guaranteed  to  exist  be- 
cause of diminishing  returns  in the research  technology,  which imply 
the  existence  of  a maximum,  technologically  feasible  rate of  growth 
for knowledge.  This  is turn implies the existence  of a maximum  feasi- 
ble rate of growth for per capita output.  Over time, the rate of growth 
of output  may be monotonically  increasing,  but it cannot  exceed  this 
upper  bound. 
Uzawa (1965)  describes  an optimizing  growth  model  in which both 
intangible  human  capital  and  physical  capital  can  be  produced.  In 
some  respects,  the  human  capital  resembles  knowledge  as described 
in this paper, but Uzawa's model does not possess any form of increas- 
ing returns to scale. Instead,  it considers  a borderline  case of constant 
returns  to scale with linear production  of human  capital. In this case, 
unbounded  growth  is possible.  Asymptotically,  output  and both types 
of  capital  grow  at the  same  constant  rate.  Other  optimizing  models 
took the rate of technological  change  as exogenously  given (e.g., Shell INCREASING  RETURNS  1007 
1967b). Various descriptive  models  of growth with elements  similar to 
those  used  here  were  also  proposed  during  the  1960s  (e.g.,  Phelps 
1966; von Wiezsacker  1966; Shell  1967a).  Knowledge  is accumulated 
by devoting  resources  to research.  Production  of consumption  goods 
exhibits constant  returns  as a function  of  tangible  inputs  (e.g.,  physi- 
cal capital and  labor) and  therefore  exhibits  increasing  returns  as a 
function  of tangible and intangible  inputs.  Privately produced  knowl- 
edge  is in some cases assumed  to be partially revealed  to other  agents 
in the  economy.  Because  the  descriptive  models  do  not  use  explicit 
objective functions,  questions  of existence  are generally  avoided,  and 
a full welfare  analysis is not possible.  Moreover,  these models  tend  to 
be relatively restrictive,  usually constructed  so that the analysis could 
be  carried  out  in  terms  of  steady  states  and  constant  growth  rate 
paths. 
Continuous-time  optimization  problems with some form of increas- 
ing returns are studied  in papers by Weitzman (1970),  Dixit, Mirrlees, 
and Stern (1975),  and Skiba (1978).  Similar issues are considered  for 
discrete-time  models  in  Majumdar  and  Mitra (1982,  1983)  and  De- 
chert  and  Nishimura  (1983).  These  papers  differ  from  the  model 
here primarily because  they are not concerned  with the existence  of a 
competitive  equilibrium.  Moreover,  in all these  papers,  the  technical 
approach  used to prove the existence  of an optimum  is different  from 
that used here. They  rely on either bounded  instantaneous  utility U(c) 
or  bounds  on  the  degree  of  increasing  returns  in the  problem;  for 
example,  the production  function f(k) is assumed  to be such that f(k)/k 
is bounded  from above. The  results here do not rely on either of these 
kinds  of  restrictions;  in  fact,  one  of  the  most  interesting  examples 
analyzed in Section  VI violates both of these restrictions.  Instead,  the 
approach  used  here  relies  on  the  assumptions  made  concerning  the 
research  technology;  the  diminishing  returns  in  research  will limit 
the rate of  growth  of  the state variable.  A general  proof  that restric- 
tions on the rate of growth of the state variable are sufficient  to prove 
the  existence  of  an  optimum  for  a  continuous-time  maximization 
problem  with nonconvexities  is given  in Romer  (1986). 
Because  an equilibrium  for the model  proposed  here  is a competi- 
tive equilibrium  with externalities,  the analysis is formally  similar to 
that used  in dynamic  models  with more conventional  kinds of  exter- 
nalities (e.g., Brock  1977; Hochman  and Hochman  1980). It also has a 
close formal similarity to perfect-foresight  Sidrauski models of money 
demand  and inflation  (Brock  1975) and to symmetric  Nash equilibria 
for dynamic  games  (e.g.,  Hansen,  Epple,  and Roberds  1985). In each 
case,  an  equilibrium  is calculated  not  by  solving  a  social  planning 
problem  but  rather by considering  the  maximization  problem  of  an 
individual  agent  who  takes as given  the  path of  some  endogenously 1008  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
determined  aggregate  variable.  In the conventional  analysis of exter- 
nalities,  the  focus  is generally  on  the  social optimum  and  the  set of 
taxes necessary  to support  it as a competitive  equilibrium.  While this 
question  is addressed  for  this  growth  model,  the  discussion  places 
more  stress  on  the  characterization  of  the  competitive  equilibrium 
without intervention  since it is the most reasonable  positive model  of 
observed  historical  growth.  One  of  the  main  contributions  of  this 
paper  is to demonstrate  how  the  analysis of  this kind of  suboptimal 
equilibrium  can proceed  using  familiar tools like a phase  plane  even 
though  the  equations  describing  the  equilibrium  cannot  be  derived 
from  any stationary  maximization  problem. 
III.  Motivation  and  Evidence 
Because  theories  of  long-run  growth  assume  away any  variation  in 
output  attributable to business cycles, it is difficult to judge  the empir- 
ical success of these  theories.  Even if one could resolve the theoretical 
ambiguity about how to filter the cycles out of the data and to extract 
the component  that growth  theory  seeks to explain,  the longest  avail- 
able  time  series  do  not  have  enough  observations  to  allow  precise 
estimates  of  low-frequency  components  or  long-run  trends.  When 
data aggregated  into decades  rather than years are used,  the pattern 
of growth  in the United  States is quite variable and is apparently  still 
influenced  by cyclical movements  in output  (see fig.  1). Cross-country 
comparisons  of growth  rates are complicated  by the difficulty of con- 
trolling  for  political  and  social  variables  that  appear  to  strongly  in- 
fluence  the  growth  process.  With  these  qualifications  in  mind,  it is 
useful  to ask whether  there  is anything  in the data that should  cause 
economists  to choose  a model  with diminishing  returns,  falling  rates 
of growth,  and convergence  across countries  rather than an alterna- 
tive without  these  features. 
Consider  first the long-run  trend in the growth rate of productivity 
or  per  capita  gross  domestic  product  (GDP).  One  revealing  way to 
consider  the long-run  evidence  is to distinguish  at any point  in time 
between  the country  that is the  "leader," that is, that has the highest 
level of  productivity,  and  all other  countries.  Growth  for  a country 
that is not a leader  will reflect at least in part the process of imitation 
and transmission  of  existing  knowledge,  whereas  the growth  rate of 
the leader  gives  some  indication  of  growth  at the  frontier  of  knowl- 
edge.  Using  GDP per man-hour  as his measure  of productivity,  Mad- 
dison  (1982)  identifies  three  countries  that  have  been  leaders  since 
1700, the  Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom,  and the  United  States. 
Table  1 reports  his estimates  of  the rate of growth of  productivity  in 
each  country  during  the  interval  when  it was the  leader.  When  the INCREASING  RETURNS  1009 
TABLE  1 
PRODUCTIVITY  GROW  H  RATES  FOR  LEADING  COUN TRIES 
Annual  Average  Compound 
Growth  Rate  of  (GDP 
Lead  Countrv  Interval  per  Man-Hour  (M) 
Netherlands  1700-1785  -.07 
United  Kingdom  17815-120  .5 
United  Kingdom  1820-90  1.4 
United  States  1890-1979  2.3 
S~ORC-MaI  ddsoln  (1982). 
productivity  growth  rate  is measured  over  intervals  several  decades 
long and compared  over almost 3 centuries,  the evidence  clearly sug- 
gests that it has been increasing,  not decreasing.  The  rate of growth of 
productivity  increases  monotonically  from  essentially  zero growth  in 
eighteenth-century  Netherlands  to 2.3 percent  per year since  1890 in 
the  United  States. 
Similar  evidence  is  apparent  from  data  for  individual  countries 
over shorter horizons.  Table 2 reports growth rates in per capita GDP 
for  the  United  States over  five subperiods  from  1800 to  1978.  (The 
raw data used here  are from  Maddison  [1979].)  These  rates also sug- 
gest  a positive  rather  than  a negative  trend,  but  measuring  growth 
rates over 40-year  intervals hides a substantial amount  of year-to-year 
or  even  decade-to-decade  variation  in the  rate of  growth.  Figure  1 
presents  the  average  growth  rate  over  the  interval  1800-1839  (for 
which  no  intervening  data  are available)  and  for  the  subsequent  14 
decades.  Identifying  a long-run  trend in rates measured  over decades 
is more  problematical  in this case, but it is straightforward  to apply a 
simple  nonparametric  test for trend. 
Table  3 reports  the results of  this kind of test for trend  in the per 
capita  rate  of  growth  in  GDP  for  several  countries  using  raw data 
TABLE  2 
PER  CAPITA  GROWTH  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Average  Annual  Compound 
Growth  Rate of  Real 
Interval  per Capita GDP  (c) 
1800-1840  .58 
1840-80  1.44 
1880-  920  1.78 
1920-60  1.68 
1960-78  2.47 
SOURC.E.-Raw data are  troin  Maddison  (1979). 1010  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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F-ItJ  1.-Axerage  annru 1 compote nd  growth  rate of  per capita GDP  in the  U~nited 
States for the interval  1800- 1839  and fo~r  14 subsequent  decades.  Data are taken from 
Madldiso~n  (1979). 
from  Maddison  (1979).  The  sample  includes  all countries  for which 
continuous  observations  on  per capita GDP are available starting  no 
later  than  1870.  As  for  the  data  for  the  United  States  graphed  in 
figure  1, the growth rates used in the test for trend are measured  over 
decades  where  possible.  The  statistic -zr  gives  the  sample  estimate  of 
the  probability that,  for any two randomly  chosen  decades,  the later 
decade  has a higher  growth  rate. 
Despite  the variability evident  from  figure  1, the test for trend  for 
the  United  States  permits  the  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  of  a 
nonpositive  trend at conventional  significance  levels. This is true even 
though  growth  over  the 4 decades  from  1800  to  1839 is treated  as a 
single observation.  However,  rejection of the null hypothesis  depends 
critically on  the  use  of  a sufficiently  long  data series.  If we drop  the 
observation  on  growth  between  1800  and  1839,  the  estimate  of Xi 
drops from  .68 to .63 and the p-value increases  from .03 to .1  f.3  If we 
further  restrict  attention  to  the  11  decades  from  1870  to  1978,  ar 
drops to .56 and the p-value increases to .29, 50 it is not surprising that 
studies  that  focus  on  the  period  since  1870  tend  to  emphasize  the 
'  The  p-value  gives  the  probability  of  observing  a value  of  ir  at least as large as the 
reported  value  under  the  null  hypothesis  that the  true  probability is .5. INCREASING  RETURNS  1011 
TABLE  3 
A  TEST  FOR  TREND  IN  PER  CAPITA  GDP  GROWTH  RATES 
Date of 
First  Number  of 
Observation  Observations  Ir  p-Value 
United  Kingdom  1700  20  .63  .06 
France  1700  18  .69  .01 
Denmark  1818  16  .70  .02 
United  States  1800  15  .68  .03 
Germany  1850  13  .67  .06 
Sweden  1861  12  .58  .25 
Italy  1861  12  .76  .01 
Australia  1861  12  .64  .11 
Norway  1865  12  .81  .002 
Japan  1870  11  .67  .07 
Canada  1870  11  .64  .12 
NOTE.-It  is the sample estimate  for each country of the probability that, for any two growth rates, the later one is 
larger. The  p-value is the probability of observing  a value of  it  at least as large as the observed  value under the null 
hypothesis  that the true probability is .5. Except in the early years when data are sparse, per capita rates of growth of 
GDP were measured  over successive  decades.  (Only two observations  on growth  rates are available for France prior 
to 1820; for the United  Kingdom, only two prior to 1800; for the United  States, only one from  1800 to 1840.) For the 
calculation  of  the p-value,  see  Kendall  (1962).  Data are from  Maddison  (1979). 
constancy  of  growth  rates  in  the  United  States.  Rejection  does  not 
appear  to depend  on the use of the rate of growth in per capita GDP 
rather than  the  rate of  growth  of  productivity.  Reliable measures  of 
the  work force  prior  to  1840  are not  available,  but using  data  from 
Kuznets  (1971)  for  the  period  1840-1960  and  from  the  1984  Eco- 
nomic Report of the President  for  1960-80,  one can construct a simi- 
lar test for trend  in the rate of growth of productivity  over successive 
decades.  The  results of  this test,  iT equal  to .64 with a p-value of  .10, 
correspond  closely to those noted  above for growth in per capita GDP 
over  the similar interval,  1840-1978. 
Over the  entire  sample  of  11 countries,  the  estimated  value  for  ar 
ranges  from  .58  to  .81,  with a p-value  that ranges  from  .25  to .002. 
Five out of  11 of the p-values are less than .05, permitting  rejection at 
the 5 percent level in a one-sided  test of the null hypothesis  that there 
is  a  nonpositive  trend  in  the  growth  rate;  eight  out  of  11  permit 
rejection  at the  10 percent  level. 
For less developed  countries,  no comparable  long-run  statistics on 
per capita income  are available. Reynolds  (1983)  gives an overview of 
the  pattern  of  development  in such  countries.  Given  the  paucity  of 
precise data for less developed  countries,  he focuses  on the "turning 
point" at which  a country  first begins  to exhibit  a persistent  upward 
trend in per capita income.  The  timing of this transition and the pace 
of subsequent  growth are strongly  influenced  by the variations in the 
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growth for the world economy  is evident  starting in the last part of the 
1800s  and  continuing  to  the  present.  This  general  pattern  is inter- 
rupted  by a significant  slowdown  during  the  years between  the  two 
world  wars and  by a remarkable  surge  from  roughly  1950  to  1973. 
Worldwide  growth since  1973 has been  slow only by comparison  with 
that surge  and  appears  to have  returned  to the high  rates that  pre- 
vailed in the  period  from  the late  180Os to  1914. 
Although  all less developed  countries  are affected  by the worldwide 
economy,  the  effects  are  not  uniform.  For  our  purposes,  the  key 
observation  is that those countries  with more extensive  prior develop- 
ment appear to benefit more from periods of rapid worldwide growth 
and suffer  less during  any slowdown.  That  is, growth rates appear to 
be  increasing  not  only  as a function  of  calendar  time  but  also  as a 
function  of  the level of development.  The  observation  that more de- 
veloped  countries  appear  to grow  relatively  faster extends  to a com- 
parison  of  industrialized  versus  less  developed  countries  as well.  In 
the  period  from  1950  to  1980,  when  official  estimates  for  GDP are 
generally  available,  Reynolds  reports  that the median  rate of  growth 
of per capita income  for his sample of 41 less developed  countries  was 
2.3  percent,  "clearly below  the  median  for  the  OECD  countries  for 
the same  period" (p. 975). 
If it is true that growth  rates are not negatively  correlated  with the 
level of per capita output  or capital, then there should  be no tendency 
for the dispersion  in the (logarithm  of the)4 level of per capita income 
to decrease  over  time.  There  should  be no tendency  toward conver- 
gence.  This  contradicts  a widespread  impression  that convergence  in 
this sense  has been  evident,  especially  since  the  Second  World  War. 
Streissler  (1979)  offers  evidence  about  the source  of  this impression 
and its robustness.  For each year from  1950 to 1974, he measures  the 
variance  across countries  of  the  logarithm  of  the  level  of  per capita 
income.  In a sample  of  ex  post industrialized  countries,  those  coun- 
tries with a level of per capita income  of at least $2,700  in 1974, clear 
evidence  of  a decrease  in the  dispersion  over  time is apparent.  In a 
sample of ex ante industrialized  countries,  countries  with a per capital 
income  of  at  least  $350  in  1950,  no  evidence  of  a decrease  in  the 
variance  is apparent.  The  first sample  differs  from  the  second  be- 
cause  it  includes  Japan  and  excludes  Argentina,  Chile,  Ireland, 
Puerto  Rico,  and  Venezuela.  As  one  would  expect,  truncating  the 
sample at the end  biases the trend  toward decreasing  dispersion  (and 
' Examining  the  dispersion  in the  logarithm  of  the  level of  per  capita income,  not 
dispersion  in the  level  itself,  is the  correct  way to test for convergence  in the  growth 
rates.  If the  rate of  growth  were  constant  across  countries  that start from  different 
levels, the dispersion  in the logarithm  of  the levels will stay constant,  but dispersion  in 
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at the beginning  toward increasing  dispersion).  When a sample of all 
possible  countries  is used,  there  is no evidence  of  a decrease  in vari- 
ance, but the interpretation  of this result is complicated  by the chang- 
ing number  of countries  in the sample in each year due to data limita- 
tions. 
Baumol  (1985)  reports similar results. When countries  are grouped 
into  industrialized,  intermediate,  centrally  planned,  and  less  devel- 
oped  economies,  he  argues  that  there  is a tendency  toward  conver- 
gence  in the level of productivity  within groups,  even though  there is 
no tendency  toward overall  convergence.  The  tendency  toward con- 
vergence  is clear only in his group  of industrialized  economies,  which 
corresponds  closely  to the  sample  of  ex  post industrialized  countries 
considered  by Streissler.  In any case,  he  finds  no obvious  pattern  in 
his entire  sample  of  countries;  if anything,  there  is a weak tendency 
toward divergence.5 
The  other kind of evidence  that bears directly on the assumption  of 
increasing  returns  in production  comes  from  growth  accounting  ex- 
ercises and the estimation  of aggregate  production  functions.  Econo- 
mists  believe  that  virtually  all  technical  change  is endogenous,  the 
outcome  of  deliberate  actions  taken by economic  agents.  If so and if 
production  exhibits  constant  returns to scale, one  would expect  to be 
able to account  for the rate of  growth of output  in terms of the rates 
of growth of all inputs.  The  difficulty  in implementing  a direct test of 
this assertion  lies in correctly  measuring  all the inputs  to production, 
especially  for intangible  capital inputs  such as knowledge.  In a com- 
prehensive  attempt  to account  for  the  rates of  growth  in output  in 
terms of  rates of  growth  of  all inputs,  including  human  and nonhu- 
man, tangible  and  intangible  stocks of  capital,  Kendrick  (1976)  con- 
cluded  that rates of growth  of inputs  are not sufficient  to explain  the 
rate of growth of output  in the 40-year  interval  1929-69.  For various 
sectors and levels of aggregation,  the rate of growth of output  is 1.06- 
1.30 times  the appropriate  aggregate  measure  of  the  rate of  growth 
for inputs. This  kind of estimate is subject to substantial, unquantified 
uncertainty  and cannot  be taken as decisive  support  for the presence 
of  increasing  returns.  But  given  the  repeated  failure  of  this kind of 
growth accounting  exercise,  there is no basis in the data for excluding 
the possibility that aggregate  production  functions  are best described 
as exhibiting  increasing  returns. 
' Baumol  (1985)  argues  that the convergence  he observes  among  the industrialized 
countries  results from a transmission  process for knowledge  that takes place among  the 
industrialized  countries  but  does  not  extend  to  centrally  planned  or  less  developed 
countries.  He would not agree that the apparent  convergence  is an artifact of an ex post 
choice  of  the  industrialized  countries.  Since  he  does  not  treat this issue directly,  it is 
diftcult  to resolve  it from  his data.  He  does  admit  that his groupings  are "somewhat 
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IV.  A Simple  Two-Period  Model 
Even in the presence  of increasing  returns and externalities,  calculat- 
ing a social optimum  is conceptually  straightforward  since it is equiva- 
lent  to  solving  a maximization  problem.  Standard  mathematical  re- 
sults can be used  to show  that a maximum  exists and to characterize 
the  solution  by means  of  a set  of  necessary  conditions.  Despite  the 
presence  of  global  increasing  returns,  the  model  here  does  have  a 
social optimum.  The  next  section  illustrates how it can be supported 
as a competitive  equilibrium  using a natural set of taxes and subsidies. 
This  optimum  is of  theoretical  and  normative  interest,  but it cannot 
be a serious candidate  for describing  the observed  long-run  behavior 
of  per capita output.  To  the  extent  that appropriate  taxes  and  sub- 
sidies have been  used  at all, they  are a quite recent  phenomenon. 
The  model  here  also  has  an  equilibrium  in  the  absence  of  any 
governmental  intervention.  Much  of  the  emphasis  in  what  follows 
focuses  on  how to characterize  the qualitative features  of this subop- 
timal dynamic equilibrium.  Although  it is suboptimal,  the competitive 
equilibrium  does  satisfy a constrained  optimality criterion that can be 
used to simplify the analysis much as the study of the social optimiza- 
tion problem  simplifies  the analysis in standard  growth  models. 
The  use of a constrained  or restricted optimization  problem is not a 
new  approach  to the  analysis  of  a suboptimal  dynamic  equilibrium. 
For example,  it has been  widely used  in the perfect-foresight  models 
of inflation.  Nonetheless,  it is useful  to describe  this method  in some 
detail because  previous  applications  do not highlight  the generality of 
the  approach  and  because  the  dynamic  setting  tends  to  obscure  its 
basic simplicity.  Hence,  I start by calculating  a competitive  equilib- 
rium for a greatly  simplified  version  of  the growth  model. 
Specifically, consider  a discrete-time  model  of growth with two pe- 
riods.  Let  each  of  S identical  consumers  have  a twice continuously 
differentiable,  strictly concave  utility function  U(Ci, C2), defined  over 
consumption  of  a single  output  good  in  periods  1 and  2.  Let each 
consumer  be given an initial endowment  of the output  good in period 
1. Suppose  that  production  of  consumption  goods  in  period  2  is a 
function  of  the  state of  knowledge,  denoted  by k, and  a set of  addi- 
tional factors such as physical capital, labor, and so forth,  denoted  by 
a vector x.6 To  restrict attention  to a choice problem  that is essentially 
6 For most of  the  subsequent  discussion,  k will be treated as a stock of disembodied 
knowledge,  i.e., knowledge  in books. This is merely an expositional  convenience  and is 
not essential.  For example,  if one  wants to assume  that all knowledge  is embodied  in 
some  kind of tangible  capital such as conventional  physical capital or human  capital, k 
can be reinterpreted  throughout  as a composite  good  made up of both knowledge  and 
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one-dimensional,  assume  that  only  the  stock  of  knowledge  can  be 
augmented;  the factors represented  by x are available in fixed supply. 
To capture  the basic idea that there  is a trade-off  between  consump- 
tion  today  and  knowledge  that  can  be  used  to  produce  more  con- 
sumption  tomorrow,  assume  that there  is a research  technology  that 
produces  knowledge  from forgone  consumption  in period  1. Because 
the  economy  here  has only  two  periods,  we need  not  be concerned 
with the  problem  that arises in an infinite-horizon  model  when  con- 
sumption  grows too fast and discounted  utility goes  to infinity. Thus 
we do  not  need  diminishing  returns  in research  to limit the  rate of 
growth of  knowledge,  and  we can choose  a simple  linear  technology 
with units such  that one  unit of  forgone  consumption  produces  one 
unit  of  knowledge.  A  more  realistic  diminishing  returns  research 
technology  is described  in the infinite-horizon  model presented  in the 
next  section. 
Since newly produced  private knowledge  can be only partially kept 
secret  and  cannot  be  patented,  we  can  represent  the  technology  of 
firm i in terms of a twice continuously  differentiable  production  func- 
tion F that depends  on  the  firm-specific  inputs  ki and  xc and on  the 
aggregate  level of  knowledge  in the economy.  If N is the number  of 
firms, define  this aggregate  level of  knowledge  as K--  I ki. 
The  first major assumption  on the production  function F(ki, K, xi) is 
that, for any fixed  value of K, F is concave  as a function  of ki and xi. 
Without  this assumption,  a competitive  equilibrium  will not  exist  in 
general.  Once  concavity  is granted,  there  is little loss of generality  in 
assuming  that F is homogeneous  of degree  one as a function  of ki and 
xi when K is held  constant;  any concave  function  can be extended  to 
be homogeneous  of degree  one  by adding  an additional  factor to the 
vector  x if necessary  (Rockafellar  1970,  p. 67).  McKenzie  (1959)  re- 
fers  to this additional  factor  as an entrepreneurial  factor.  It can be 
interpreted  as an accounting  device  that transforms  any profits  into 
factor payments. 
By the homogeneity  of F in ki and xi and by the assumption  that F is 
increasing  in the  aggregate  stock of  knowledge,  K, it follows  that F 
exhibits  increasing  returns  to scale.  For any t  >  1, 
F(vki, SK, Ax)  >  F(Jki, K, Maxi)  =  4vF(ki  K, xi). 
The  second  major  assumption  strengthens  this  considerably.  It  re- 
quires that F exhibit global increasing marginal productivity of knowl- 
edge  from a social point of view. That is, for any fixed x, assume that 
F(k, Nk, x),  production  per  firm  available  to  a dictator  who  can  set 
economywide  values  for  k,  is  convex  in  k,  not  concave.  This 
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guishes  the  production  function  used  here  from  the one  used  in the 
models  of Arrow,  Levhari,  and  Sheshinski. 
The  equilibrium  for the two-period  model is a standard competitive 
equilibrium  with externalities.  Each firm maximizes  profits taking K, 
the aggregate  level of knowledge,  as given. Consumers  supply part of 
their endowment  of output  goods  and all the other factors x to firms 
in period  1. With the proceeds,  they purchase output  goods in period 
2. Consumers  and  firms  maximize  taking  prices  as given.  As usual, 
the  assumption  that agents  treat prices and  the aggregate  level K as 
given  could  be  rationalized  in a model  with a continuum  of  agents. 
Here,  it is treated  as the  usual  approximation  for  a large  but  finite 
number  of  agents.  Because  of  the externality,  all firms could  benefit 
from a collusive  agreement  to invest more in research.  Although  this 
agreement  would  be  Pareto-improving  in  this  model,  it  cannot  be 
supported  for the same reasons that collusive agreements  fail in mod- 
els without  externalities.  Each firm would  have an incentive  to shirk, 
not investing  its share of output  in research.  Even if all existing  firms 
could be compelled  to comply,  for example,  by an economywide  mer- 
ger, new entrants  would  still be able to free-ride  and undermine  the 
equilibrium. 
Because  of  the  assumed  homogeneity  of F with  respect  to factors 
that receive  compensation,  profits for firms will be zero and the scale 
and  number  of  firms  will be  indeterminate.  Consequently,  we  can 
simplify  the  notation  by  restricting  attention  to  an  equilibrium  in 
which  the  number  of  firms, N,  equals  the  number  of  consumers,  S. 
Then  per firm and per capita values coincide.  Assuming  that all firms 
operate  at the  same  level  of  output,  we can  omit  firm-specific  sub- 
scripts. 
Let x  denote  the  per capita (and per  firm) endowment  of  the fac- 
tors that cannot be augmented;  let e denote  the per capita endowment 
of the output  good  in period  1. To calculate an equilibrium,  define  a 
family of  restricted  maximization  problems  indexed  by K: 
P(K):  max  U(cI,  c2) 
kEE[O,  e] 
subject to  cl  c  e  -  ke 
C2  <  F(k, K, x), 
x  c  x 
Since U is strictly concave  and F(k, K, x) is concave in k and x for each 
value of K, P(K) will have a unique solution k for each value of K. (The 
solution  for x  is trivially i.)  In general,  the implied  values  for cl,  c2, 
and k have no economic  meaning.  If K differs  from Sk, then F(k, K, x) 
is not a feasible level of  per capita consumption  in period  2. Equilib- 
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in the economy  be consistent  with the level that is assumed when firms 
make  production  decisions.  If  we  define  a function  r:  RJR.  R  that 
sends K into S times the value of k that achieves the maximum  for the 
problem P(K), this suggests  fixed points of r as candidates  for equilib- 
ria. 
To  see  that any fixed  point  K* of r can indeed  be supported  as a 
competitive  equilibrium,  observe that P(K*) is a concave maximization 
problem with solution k* =  K*IS, cl  -e  -  k*,  and c  = F(k*, Sk*, x)* 
Since it is concave,  standard  necessary  conditions  for concave  prob- 
lems apply. Let Y denote  a Lagrangian  for P(K*) with multipliers pl, 
P2e and w: 
=  U(CI,  C2)  +  pi(i  -  -  c1)  +  p2[F(k,  K,  X)  -  C2]  +  W(I  -  X). 
When an interior solution  is assumed,  familiar arguments  show that p3 
-DjU(c,  c2*)  forj  =  1, 2, that p,  =  p2DF(k*,  Sk*,  ), and  that w- 
p2D3F(k*, Sk*>  X).7 As always, the shadow  prices w and p1  can be inter- 
preted  as equilibrium  prices. To  see this, consider  first the maximiza- 
tion problem  of the firm: maxkp2F(k,  SO,  x)  -  pik  -  w  x  X. Since the 
firm takes both  prices  and  the  aggregate  level  Sk* as given,  a trivial 
application  of  the  sufficient  conditions  for  a concave  maximization 
problem demonstrates  that k* and i  are optimal choices for the firm. 
By the homogeneity  of F with respect to its first and third arguments, 
profits will be zero at these  values. Consider  next  the problem  of the 
consumer.  Income  to the  consumer  will be the value  of  the  endow- 
ment,  I  =  pie  +  w  I  =  p2F(k*, Sk*, x)  +  p&  -  4*).  (The  second 
equality  follows  from  the  homogeneity  of F  in  k and  x.)  When  the 
necessary  conditions  p1 =  DjU(cl ,  c4) from  the  problem  P(K*)  are 
used,  it follows  immediately  that cr and  e  are solutions  to the prob- 
lem max U(C  I,  2)  subject to the budget constraint p1c,  +  p2c  ?  I. Note 
that  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  for  consumers  will equal  the 
private  marginal  rate of  transformation  perceived  by firms, D1U(cl 
?2)/D2U(C,  I4)  =  DjF(k*, Sk*, x). Because  of the externality,  this dif- 
fers from  the true marginal  rate of  transformation  for the economy, 
D1F(k*, Sk*,  )  +  SD2F(k*, Sk*, i). 
Arguments  along  these  lines  can be  used  quite  generally  to show 
that a fixed  point of a mapping  like r defined  by a family of concave 
problems  P(K) can  be  supported  as a competitive  equilibrium  with 
externalities.  The  necessary  conditions  from  a version  of  the  Kuhn- 
Tucker  theorem  generate  shadow  prices associated  with any solution 
to P(K). The  sufficient  conditions  for  the  problems  of  the consumer 
and  the  firm can then  be  used  to show  that the quantities  from  the 
7 Here,  D  denotes  a derivative,  Di the  partial derivative  with  respect  to the  ith  ar- 
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solution  will be  chosen  in  an  equilibrium  in  which  these  prices  are 
taken as given.  Conversely,  an argument  similar to the usual proof  of 
the Pareto optimality  of competitive  equilibrium  can be used  to show 
that  any  competitive  equilibrium  with  externalities  for  this  kind  of 
economy  will satisfy the restricted  optimality  condition  implicit in the 
problem  P(K) (Romer  1983). That  is, if K* is an equilibrium  value of 
aggregate  knowledge,  then  K*/S will solve  the  problem  P(K*). Thus 
equilibria are equivalent  to fixed  points of  the  function  F. 
This allows an important  simplification  because it is straightforward 
to characterize  fixed  points of F in terms of the underlying  functions 
U and F. Substituting  the constraints  from P(K) into the objective and 
using the fact that x will be chosen  to be x, define  a new function  V(k, 
K) =  UV  -  k, F(k, K, i)).  Because  of the increasing  marginal produc- 
tivity of knowledge,  V is not a concave  function;  but for any fixed K, it 
is concave  in K. Then  the optimal  choice  of k in any problem  P(K) is 
determined  by the equation  D1  V(k,  K)  =  0. Fixed points of F are then 
given  by  substituting  Sk for  K  and  solving  DIV(k, Sk)  0.  Given 
functional  forms  for  U and F, this equation  can immediately  be writ- 
ten  in explicit  form.  The  analysis  can  therefore  exploit  a three-way 
equivalence  between  competitive  equilibria  with  externalities,  fixed 
points  of  F, and  solutions  to an explicit  equation  DIV(k, Sk) =  0. 
The  key observation  in this analysis  is that equilibrium  quantities 
can be characterized  as the solution  to a concave  maximization  prob- 
lem. Then  prices can be generated  from shadow prices or multipliers 
for  this  problem.  The  complete  statement  of  the  problem  must  be 
sought simultaneously  with its solution  because the statement  involves 
the equilibrium  quantities.  But since P(K) is a family of concave  prob- 
lems, solving  simultaneously  for the statement of the problem and for 
its solution  amounts  to making  a simple  substitution  in a first-order 
condition. 
V.  Infinite-Horizon  Growth 
A.  Description  of the Model 
The  analysis of the infinite-horizon  growth model  in continuous  time 
proceeds  exactly as in the two-period  example  above. Individual  firms 
are assumed  to have  technologies  that depend  on  a path K(t), t ?  0, 
for aggregate  knowledge.  For an arbitrary path K, we can consider  an 
artificial planning  problem PO(K)  that maximizes the utility of a repre- 
sentative  consumer  subject to the  technology  implied  by the  path K. 
Assume  that preferences  over  the single  consumption  good  take the 
usual additively  separable,  discounted  form,  f  U(c(t))e - 8bdt  with 8 > INCREASING  RETURNS  1019 
0.  The  function  U is defined  over  the  positive  real numbers  and can 
have U(O) equal to a finite number  or to  -  x,  for example,  when  U(c) 
=  ln(c). Following  the  notation  from  the  last section,  let F(k(t), K(t), 
x(t)) denote  the instantaneous  rate of output  for a firm as a function 
of  firm-specific  knowledge  at time  t, economywide  aggregate  knowl- 
edge  at time t, and the level of all other  inputs at t. As before,  we will 
assume  that  all agents  take  prices  as given  and  that  firms  take  the 
aggregate  path  for  knowledge  as given. 
Additional  knowledge  can  be  produced  by forgoing  current  con- 
sumption,  but the  trade-off  is no longer  assumed  to be one-for-one. 
By investing  an amount  I of forgone  consumption  in research, a firm 
with a current stock of private knowledge  k induces a rate of growth k 
=  G(I, k). The  function  G is assumed  to be concave and homogeneous 
of degree  one;  the accumulation  equation  can therefore  be rewritten 
in terms of proportional  rates of growth,  ilk  /  g(Ilk), with g(y) =  G(y, 
1). A crucial additional  assumption  is that g is bounded  from above by 
a constant  ct. This  imposes  a strong  form  of  diminishing  returns  in 
research. Given the private stock of knowledge,  the marginal product 
of  additional  investment  in  research,  Dg,  falls  so  rapidly  that  g  is 
bounded.  An  inessential  but natural assumption  is that g is bounded 
from below by the value g(O) =  0. Knowledge  does not depreciate,  so 
zero research implies zero change  in k; moreover,  existing  knowledge 
cannot  be converted  back into  consumption  goods.  As a normaliza- 
tion to fix the units of  knowledge,  we can specify  that Dg(O) =  1; one 
unit of knowledge  is the amount  that would be produced  by investing 
one  unit of  consumption  goods  at an arbitrarily slow rate. 
Assume  as before  that  factors  other  than  knowledge  are  in fixed 
supply.  This  implies  that  physical  capital,  labor,  and  the  size of  the 
population  are held  constant.  If labor were  the only  other  factor  in 
the  model,  exponential  population  growth  could  be  allowed  at the 
cost of additional  notation;  but as was emphasized  in the discussion  of 
previous  models,  a key  distinguishing  feature  of  this  model  is that 
population  growth  is  not  necessary  for  unbounded  growth  in  per 
capita income.  For simplicity  it is left out.  Allowing  for accumulation 
of physical capital would  be of more interest,  but the presence  of two 
state variables would  preclude  the simple  geometric  characterization 
of  the  dynamics  that  is possible  in the  case of  one  state variable.  If 
knowledge  and  physical capital are assumed  to be used  in fixed  pro- 
portions  in production,  the variable k(t) can be interpreted  as a com- 
posite  capital good.  (This  is essentially  the approach  used  by Arrow 
[1962]  in  the  learning-by-doing  model.)  Given  increasing  marginal 
productivity  of  knowledge,  increasing  marginal  productivity  of  a 
composite  k would  still be possible if the increasing  marginal  produc- 1020  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
tivity of  knowledge  were  sufficient  to outweigh  the  decreasing  mar- 
ginal  productivity  associated  with the  physical capital. 
Within  the  restrictions  imposed  by tractability and  simplicity,  the 
assumptions  on the technology  attempt to capture important  features 
of  actual  technologies.  As  noted  in  Section  II,  estimated  aggregate 
production  functions  do  appear  to exhibit  some  form  of  increasing 
returns to scale. Assuming  that the increasing  returns arise because of 
increasing  marginal  productivity  of knowledge  accords with the plau- 
sible conjecture  that,  even  with  fixed  population  and  fixed  physical 
capital, knowledge  will never reach a level where its marginal product 
is so low that it is no longer  worth the trouble it takes to do research. If 
the  marginal  product  of  knowledge  were  truly  diminishing,  this 
would  imply  that Newton,  Darwin,  and  their  contemporaries  mined 
the richest veins of ideas and that scientists now must sift through  the 
tailings and extract ideas from low-grade  ore. That  knowledge  has an 
important  public  good  characteristic  is generally  recognized.8  That 
the production  of  new knowledge  exhibits  some  form of diminishing 
marginal  productivity  at any  point  in time  should  not be controver- 
sial.  For  example,  even  though  it  may  be  possible  to  develop  the 
knowledge  needed  to produce  usable energy  from  nuclear  fusion  by 
devoting  less than  1 percent  of annual  gross national  product  (GNP) 
to the  research  effort  over  a period  of  20  years,  it is likely that this 
knowledge  could  not be produced  by next  year regardless  of the size 
of  the current  research  effort. 
B.  Existence and Characterization  of a Social Optimum 
Before  using  necessary  conditions  to  characterize  the  solutions  to 
either  the social optimization  problem,  denoted  as PS.,  or any of the 
artificial optimization  problems  P  (K), I must verify that these  prob- 
lems have solutions.  First I state the problems  precisely. Let ko denote 
the initial stock of knowledge  per firm for the economy.  As in the last 
section,  I will always work with  the  same  number  of  firms and  con- 
sumers.  Because  the  choice  of  x  =  x is trivial, I suppress  this argu- 
ment, writingf(k,  K) =  F(k, K, x). Also, let i(k)  = f(k, Sk) = F(k, Sk, t) 
denote  the  globally  convex  (per  capita)  production  function  that 
would  be  faced  by a social  planner.  In  all problems  that follow,  the 
constraint k(t) 2  0 for all t ?  0 and the initial condition  k(O) =  ko will 
be understood: 
8  See, e.g.  Bernstein  and Nadiri (1983)  for estimates  from the chemical industry sug- 
gesting  that spillover  effects  can  be quite  large. INCREASING  RETURNS  1021 
PS,:  max {  U(c(t))e 8'dt 
subject  to  k(t)  (  (h(t)  ) 
Px(K):  max {  U(c(t))e 8'dt 
subject  to  k(t)  K  C 
k(t)  k(t) 
Note that the only difference  between  these two problems lies in the 
specification  of the production  function.  In the first case, it is convex 
and  invariant over  time.  In the second,  it is concave  but depends  on 
time  through  its dependence  on  the  path  K(t). I can  now  state  the 
theorem  that guarantees  the  existence  of  solutions  to each  of  these 
problems. 
THEOREM  1. Assume  that each  of  U, f, and g is a continuous  real- 
valued  function  defined  on  a subset  of  the  real line.  Assume  that U 
and g are concave.  Suppose  that i(k)  = f(k,  Sk) satisfies a bound  9;(k) 
c  p.  +  k' and  that g(z)  satisfies  the  bounds  0  ?  g(x)  c  at for  real 
numbers  p., p, and a. Then  if  tp is less than the discount  factor 8, PSC 
has a finite-valued  solution,  and Pcx(K)  has a finite-valued  solution  for 
any path K(t) such  that K(t) e  K(O)eo'. 
The  proof,  given in an appendix  available on request, amounts  to a 
check that the conditions  of theorem  I in Romer  (1986)  are satisfied. 
Note that if (x  is less than 8 the inequality otp  <  8 allows for p >  1. Thus 
the socially feasible production  function  i  can be globally convex  in k, 
with  a  marginal  social  product  and  an  average  social  product  of 
knowled ge  that increase  without  bound. 
The  analysis of  the social planning  problem  PS3, in terms of a cur- 
rent-valued  Hamiltonian  and  a  phase  plane  follows  along  familiar 
lines (see, e.g.,  Arrow  1967; Cass and Shell  1976a,  1976b). Define H(k, 
X) =  max,  U(c) +  X{kg([  (k) -  c]lk)}. For simplicity, assume  that the 
functions  U, f, and g are twice continuously  differentiable.  The  first- 
order  necessary  conditions  for a path k(t) to be a maximum  for PS, 
are  that  there  exists  a  path  X(t) such  that  the  system  of  first-order 
differential  equations  k  =  D2H(k,  K) and  A  =  8X  -  D IH(k,  A) are 
satisfied and that the paths satisfy two boundary  conditions:  the initial 
condition  on  k and  the  transversality  condition  at  infinity,  lim, 
X(t)k(t)e8-  =  Wt 
X)  Prosing  the  necessity  of' the  transversality  condition  for  a maximization  problem 
that is not concave  takes relatively  sophisticated  mathematical  methods.  Ekeland  and 1022  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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FIG, 2.-Geometry  of the phase  plane  for a typical social optimum.  Arrows indicate 
directions  of  trajectories  in different  sections  of  the plane.  The  rate of change  of  the 
stock of knowledge,  k, is zero everywhere  on or below the locus denoted  by k =*O; SO 
denotes  the  socially optimal  trajectory  that stays everywhere  between  the lines X =  0 
and k =  0. 
Under  the assumption  that limbo  DU(c)  =  oo, maximizing  over c in 
the  definition  of  H(k,  X) implies  that  DU(c)  =  XDg([9(k)  -  c]/k) 
whenever  the constraint k ?  0 is not binding; otherwise, c =  i(k).  This 
gives  c as a function  of  k and  X. Substituting  this expression  in  the 
equations  for  k and  A gives  a  system  of  first-order  equations  that 
depends  only  on k and  X. 
Because  of  the  restriction  that k be nonnegative,  the  plane  can be 
divided  into  two regions  defined  by k =  0 and k -  0 (see fig. 2). In 
a convenient  abuse  of  the  terminology,  I will refer  to  the  locus  of 
points dividing  these  two regions  as the k =  0 locus. Along  this locus, 
both the conditions  c =  i;(k)  and DU(c)  =  XDg([f(k)  -  c]lk) must hold. 
Thus  the k =  0 locus is defined  by the equation DU(9(k))  =  X. By the 
concavity  of  U,  it  must  be  a  nonincreasing  curve  in  the  k-X plane. 
As  usual,  the  equation  A =  0 defines  a simple  locus  in the  plane. 
When the derivative DIH(k, X) is evaluated  along the k =  0 locus, the 
equation  for A there  can be written A/X =  8-  D(k).  If D9  increases 
without  bound,  there  exists a value of k such that D9(k)  >  8 for all k 
Scheinkman  (1983)  prove  the necessity  of the transversality condition  for nonconcave 
discrete-time  problems.  In  continuous  time,  a  proof  that  requires  a  local  Lipschitz 
condition  is given  by Aubin  and  Clarke (1979). INCREASING  RETURNS  1023 
larger than k, and for all such k, the A =  0 locus lies above the k =  0 
locus.  It may be either  upward  or downward  sloping.  If 3; were con- 
cave and satisfied the usual Inada conditions,  i  =  0 would cross k =  0 
from above and the resulting  steady state would be stable in the usual 
saddle-point  sense.  Here,  K =  0 may cross k =  0 either from above or 
from below. If D9i(k) is everywhere  greater than 8, the A =  0 locus lies 
everywhere  above  the  k  =  0  locus,  and  k can  be  taken  to  be  zero. 
(This  is the case illustrated  in fig. 2.)  Starting  from  any initial value 
greater  than  k, the  optimal  trajectory (K(t),  k(t)), t ?  0, must  remain 
above  the  region  where  k =  0.  Any  trajectory that crosses  into  this 
region  can  be  shown  to  violate  the  transversality  condition.  Conse- 
quently,  k(t) grows  without  bound  along  the optimal  trajectory. 
This social optimum  cannot  be supported  as a competitive  equilib- 
rium  in  the  absence  of  government  intervention.  Any  competitive 
firm  that  takes K(t) as  given  and  is faced  with  the  social  marginal 
products as competitive  prices will choose  not to remain at the optimal 
quantities even if it expects  all other firms to do so. Each firm will face 
a private marginal  product  of knowledge  (measured  in terms of cur- 
rent output  goods)  equal to D1f; but the true shadow price of capital 
will be Dlf  +  SD2f  >  Dlf.  Given  this difference,  each  firm would 
choose  to acquire less than the socially optimal amount of knowledge. 
C.  Existence  and Characterization  of the 
Competitive  Equilibrium 
Under  a general  set of conditions,  this economy  can be shown to have 
a  suboptimal  equilibrium  in  the  absence  of  any  intervention.  It  is 
completely  analogous  to the equilibrium  for the two-period  model.  As 
in that model,  it is straightforward  to show that there  is a three-way 
equivalence  between  competitive  equilibria,  fixed  points of  the map- 
ping  that  sends  a path  K(t) into  S times  the  solution  to PR,(K),  and 
solutions  to an equation  of the form DI V(k, Sk) =  0.10 In the infinite- 
horizon  case,  this equation  consists  of  a system of  differential  equa- 
tions, which can be represented  in terms of a phase plane, and a set of 
boundary  conditions. 
To derive these equations,  consider  the necessary conditions  for the 
concave problem P,(K).  Define  a Hamiltonian,  denoted  as H  to distin- 
guish it from the Hamiltonian  H for the social planning  problem PS.: 
10 An explicit proof  of this result is given  in Romer  (1983).  The  method  of proof  is 
exactly  as outlined  in the  two-period  model.  A generalized  Kuhn-Tucker  theorem  is 
used  to derive  the necessary  conditions  that yield shadow  prices for the maximization 
problems  P(K).  Suppose  K* is a fixed  point.  If the consumer  and  the firm are faced 
with the shadow  prices associated  with P4(K*), the sufficient  conditions  for their max- 
imization  problems  are shown  to be satisfied at the quantities  that solve P4(K*). 1024  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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Then  the  necessary  conditions  for  k(t) to be  a solution  to PT(K) are 
that there exists a path X(t)  such that k(t) =  D2H(k(t), X(t),  K(t)) and X(t) 
-  8X(t) -  DIH(k(t),  X(t), K(t)) and  such  that  the  paths  k(t) and  X(t) 
satisfy the boundary  conditions  k(O) =  ko and lime,  X(t)k(t)e't  =  0. 
Substituting  Sk(t) for  K(t) yields  an  autonomous  system  of  differen- 
tial equations,  k(t) =  DH(k(t),  X(t), Sk(t)), A(t)-  X(t) -  D1H(k(t), X(t), 
Sk(t)), that  can  be  characterized  using  the  phase  plane.  The  two 
boundary  conditions  must  still hold.  Any  paths  for k(t) and  X(t) that 
satisfy these  equations  and  the  boundary  conditions  will correspond 
to  a competitive  equilibrium,  and  all competitive  equilibria  can  be 
characterized  this way. 
Before  considering  phase diagrams,  I must show that a competitive 
equilibrium  exists for some class of models.  Standard results concern- 
ing the existence  of solutions  of differential  equations  can be used  to 
prove  that the  equations  for  X and  k determine  a unique  trajectory 
through  any  point  (ki,  K) in the  phase  plane.  The  difficulty  arises in 
showing  that  for any given  value  of ko there  exists  some  value  of  Xo 
such that the  transversality  condition  at infinity is satisfied along  the 
trajectory  through  (k(,  A0). As  opposed  to  the  case  in  which  these 
equations  are generated  by a concave  maximization  problem  known 
to have a solution,  there  is no assurance  that such a X( exists. 
The  basic idea  in the  proof  that such  a X0 exists,  and  hence  that a 
competitive  equilibrium  exists,  is illustrated  in  example  I  from  the 
next section.  To  state the general  result,  I need  additional  conditions 
that characterize  the  asymptotic  behavior  of  the  functions  f  and  g. 
This  is accomplished  by means of an asymptotic  exponent  as defined 
by Brock and Gale (1969). Given a function h(y), define  the asymptotic 
exponent  e of h as e =  limo  logljh(y)l.  Roughly speaking, h(y) behaves 
asymptotically  like  the  power  function  ye.  Also,  recall  that  x is  the 
maximal  rate of  growth  for k implied  by the research  technology. 
THEOREM  2.  In addition  to the  assumptions  of  theorem  1, assume 
that UCf, and g are twice continuously  differentiable.  Assume also that 
A(k) =  f(k, Sk) has an asymptotic exponent  p such that p >  I and op < 
&. Finally, assume  that Dg(x)  has an asymptotic  exponent  strictly less 
than  -  I. Let k be such that DIf(k, Sk) >8  for allk  >  k. Then  if ko >  K, 
there  exists  a competitive  equilibrium  with externalities  in which c(t) 
and k(t) grow  without  bound. 
The  proof  is given in Romer (1983,  theorem  3). The  assumption  on 
the  asymptotic  growth  of  9; is self-explanatory.  The  assumption  on 
the asymptotic exponent  of Dg is sufficient  to ensure  the boundedness 
of g. The  condition  on D1 f will be satisfied in most cases in which 9(k) INCREASING  RETURNS  1025 
-  ik, Sk) is convex.  Examples  of  functions  satisfying  these  assump- 
tions are given  in the next  section. 
Once  the conditions  for the existence  of a competitive  equilibrium 
have been  established,  the analysis reduces  once again to the study of 
the  phase  plane  summarizing  the  information  in  the  differential 
equations.  In  many  respects,  this  analysis  is similar  to  that  for  the 
social optimum  for this economy.  The  phase plane can once again be 
divided into regions where k =  0 and k >  0. Since by definition  ;i(k) = 
f(k, Sk), the equations  for c as a function  of k and X will be identical to 
those in the social optimum:  DU(c)  =Dg([f(k,  Sk) -  c]Ik)  if k >  0, c = 
f,  Sk) if k =  0. As a result,  the boundary  locus for the region  k =  0 
will also  be  identical  with  that  from  the  social  optimum.  The  only 
difference  arises in the equation  for A. Although  the equality H(k, X) 
=  H(k, K, Sk) does  hold,  the  derivatives  DIH(k, A) and DIH(k, K, Sk) 
differ.  In the first case, a term involving the expression  D9(k)  =  Dlf(k, 
Sk) +  SD2f(k, Sk) will appear.  In the second  case, only the first part of 
this  expression,  Diflk,  Sk), appears.  Therefore,  D1H(k, A) is always 
larger  than  D  fH(k, K, Sk). Consequently,  the  A  =  0  locus  for  the 
competitive  equilibrium  must lie below  that for the social optimum. 
As was true  of  the  social optimum,  the  K =  0 locus  can be either 
upward or downward  sloping.  If Dlf(k,  Sk) >  8 for all k greater  than 
some value k, the K =  0 locus will lie above k =  0 for values of k to the 
right of k. Then  the qualitative analysis is the same as that presented 
for the social optimum.  Starting from an initial value ko >  k, the only 
candidate  paths  for  equilibria  are  ones  that  stay above  the  k  =  0 
region;  as  before,  paths  that  cross  into  this  region  will violate  the 
transversality condition.  A trajectory lying everywhere  in the region 
where  k  >  0  can  fail  to  have  k(t) grow  without  bound  only  if  the 
trajectory asymptotically approaches  a critical point where A and k are 
both  zero,  but  no  such  point  exists  to the  right  of  k. Hence,  all the 
trajectories that are possible candidates  for an equilibrium  have paths 
for k(t) that grow  without  bound.  The  existence  result in theorem  2 
shows that at least one  such path satisfies the transversality condition 
at infinity. 
D.  Welfare  Analysis of the Competitive  Equilibrium 
The  welfare  analysis of  the  competitive  equilibrium  is quite  simple. 
The  intuition from simple  static models  with externalities  or from the 
two-period  model  presented  in Section  III  carries over  intact to the 
dynamic  model  here.  In the calculation  of  the marginal  productivity 
of  knowledge,  each firm recognizes  the private return  to knowledge, 
Dlf(k,  Sk), but neglects  the effect  due  to the change  in the aggregate 
level,  SD2f(k, Sk); an increase  in k induces  a positive  external  effect 1026  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL ECONOMY 
D2f(k, Sk) on  each  of  the S firms in the  economy.  Consequently,  the 
amount of consumption  at any point in time is too high in the compet- 
itive equilibrium  and the amount  of research is too low. Any interven- 
tion  that shifts  the  allocation  of  current  goods  away from  consump- 
tion and toward research  will be welfare-improving.  As in any model 
with externalities,  the government  can achieve  Pareto improvements 
not available to private  agents  because  its powers of  coercion  can be 
used  to overcome  problems  of  shirking. 
If the government  has access to lump-sum  taxation, any number  of 
subsidy  schemes  will  support  the  social  optimum.  Along  the  paths 
k*(t)  and  X*(t) from  the  social optimum,  taxes and subsidies  must be 
chosen  so that the  first partial derivative  of  the  Hamiltonian  for the 
competitive  equilibrium  with taxes equals the first partial derivative of 
the  Hamiltonian  for  the  social  planning  problem;  that is, the  taxes 
and  subsidies  must  be  chosen  so that  the  after-tax  private  marginal 
product  of  knowledge  is equal  to  the  social  marginal  product.  This 
can be accomplished  by subsidizing  holdings  of k, subsidizing accumu- 
lation k, or subsidizing  output  and taxing  factors of production  other 
than  k. The  simplest  scheme  is  for  the  government  to  pay  a time- 
varying subsidy  of  ri(t) units of consumption  goods  for each unit of 
knowledge  held by the firm. If this subsidy is chosen  to be equal to the 
term  neglected  by private  agents,  ul(t)  =  SD2f(k*(t), Sk*(t)), private 
and social marginal  products  will be equal.  A subsidy U2(t) paid to a 
firm  for  each  unit  of  goods  invested  in  research  would  be easier  to 
implement  but is harder  to characterize.  In general,  solving  for crAt) 
requires  the  solution  of  a  system  of  differential  equations  that  de- 
pends  on  the  path  for k*(t), In  the  special  case in which  production 
takes the form f(k, K)  =  kVKY,  the optimal  subsidy can be shown  to be 
constant,  O2  = -y/(v  +  y). (This calculation  is also included  in the app. 
available on  request.) 
While  it is clear  that  the  social  marginal  product  of  knowledge  is 
greater  than  the  private  marginal  product  in  the  no-intervention 
competitive  equilibrium,  this does  not necessarily  imply that interest 
rates in the socially optimal  competitive  equilibrium  with taxes will be 
higher  than  in  the  suboptimal  equilibrium.  In  each  case,  the  real 
interest rate on loans made  in units of output  goods  can be written as 
r(t) =  -  (p),  where p(t) =  e  -  btDU(c(t)) is the present  value price for 
consumption  goods  at date t. When  utility takes the constant elasticity 
form  U(c)  =  [c  -  I/(  -  0), this reduces  to r(t) =  8  +  O(Qc).  In 
the linear  utility case in which  0  =  0, r will equal 8 regardless  of the 
path  for  consumption  and  in  particular  will be  the  same  in the  two 
equilibria.  This  can occur  even  though  the  marginal  productivity  of 
knowledge  differs  because  the  price  of  knowledge  in terms  of  con- 
sumption  goods  (equal  to  the  marginal  rate  of  transformation  be- INCREASING  RETURNS  1027 
tween  knowledge  and  consumption  goods)  can  vary.  Holders  of 
knowledge  earn capital gains and losses as well as a direct return equal 
to  the  private  marginal  productivity  of  knowledge.  In  the  case  of 
linear utility, these capital gains and losses adjust so that interest rates 
stay the same. 
This  logical point  notwithstanding,  it is likely that interest rates will 
be higher  in the social optimum.  On average,  Uc will be higher  in the 
social optimum;  higher  initial  rates  of  investment  with  lower  initial 
consumption  must ultimately lead to higher  levels of consumption.  If 
there  is any curvature  in the  utility function  U, so that 0 is positive, 
interest  rates  in  the  optimum  will  be  greater  than  in  the  no- 
intervention  equilibrium.  In contrast to the usual presumption,  cost- 
benefit  calculations  in  a suboptimal  equilibrium  should  use  a social 
rate of discount  that is higher  than  the  market rate of  interest. 
VI.  Examples 
To illustrate the range of behavior  possible in this kind of model,  this 
section  examines  specific  functional  forms  for the utility function  U, 
the production  function f,  and the function  g describing  the research 
technology.  Because  the goal is to reach qualitative conclusions  with a 
minimum  of  algebra,  the  choice  of  functional  form  will be  guided 
primarily by analytical convenience.  For the  production  function,  as- 
sume thatf  takes the form noted  above,f(k,  K) =  kTK7. This is conve- 
nient  because  it implies  that the  ratio of  the  private and  social mar- 
ginal products, 
D  f(k,_  Sk)  v 
DI f(k,  Sk) +  SD2f(k,  Sk)  v  +  ly 
is constant.  Nonincreasing  private marginal  productivity  implies  that 
o <  v i  1; increasing  social marginal  productivity  implies  that  1 <  -y 
+  v. With these  parameter  values,  this functional  form is reasonable 
only for large values of k. For small values of k, the private and social 
marginal  productivity  of  knowledge  is implausibly  small;  at k  =  0, 
they are both zero. This  causes no problem  provided  we take a mod- 
erately  large  initial ko as given.  An  analysis starting  from  ko close  to 
zero  would  have  to  use  a more  complicated  (and  more  reasonable) 
functional  form  forf 
Recall that the rate of increase  of the stock of knowledge  is written 
in  the  homogeneous  form  k  =  G(I, k)  =  kg(JIk), where  I is output 
minus consumption.  The  requirements  on the concave  function g are 
the normalization  Dg(0)  =  I and  the bound  g(Ik)  <  for all Ilk. An 
analytically simple  form  satisfying  these  requirements  is g(z)  =  a( 
+  z).  Recalling  that  8  is the  discount  rate,  note  that  the  bound  re- 1028  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
quired  for the  existence  of  a social optimum  as given  in theorem  I 
requires the additional  restriction  that o(v  +  y) < &. Given the stated 
parameter  restrictions,  it is easy  to verify  that f and g satisfy all the 
requirements  of  theorems  I and  2. 
A.  Example I 
With  this  specification  of  the  technology  for  the  economy,  we  can 
readily examine  the qualitative behavior  of the model  for logarithmic 
utility U(c)  = ln(c).  The  Hamiltonian  can then  be written as 
H(k, X, K, c)  =  ln(c)  +  Xg  (k, K) 
Along  (the boundary  of the region  in which)  =4  0, Dg(O) =  I implies 
that c  =  A  '.50  k =  0 is determined  by the equation 
X =  [f(k, Sk)l -  Skyk(v  - 
). 
The  exact form for the locus  =0  is algebraically complicated,  but it 
is straightforward  to show that, for large k, X =  0 lies above the k =  0 
locus  since  Dlf(k,  Sk) will be  greater  than  &. Also,  if  we  define  the 
curve LI in the phase plane by the equation  A  =  [1/(8  -  a)]kk '  the A 
=  0 locus must cross LI from above as indicated  in figure  3. (Details 
are given in the app. available on request.) Thus k -  0 behaves as k to 
the power  -  (v +  -y)  <  -  1, and A =  0 is eventually  trapped between k 
=  0 and a line described  by k to the power  -  1. In figure 3, represen- 
tative trajectories  t1 and  t2 together  with the competitive  equilibrium 
trajectory CE are used  to indicate  the direction  of  trajectories in the 
various  parts of  the  plane  instead  of  the  usual arrows. 
Because the line LI is of the form K =  [ 1/(8 -  a)]k 
- '  any trajectory 
that eventually  remains  below LI will satisfy the transversality condi- 
tion lim,.e  tk(t)X(t)  =  0. Given the geometry  of the phase plane, it is 
clear that there  must  exist  a trajectory  that always remains  between 
the loci A =  0 and k =  0. Given the initial value ko, index  by the value 
of K  all the trajectories that start at a point (ko,  K)  between the two loci. 
The  set of K's  corresponding  to trajectories that cross  =  0 can have 
no  smallest  value,  the  set  of  K's that correspond  to trajectories  that 
cross  k  =  0  can  have  no  largest  value,  and  the  two  sets  must  be 
disjoint. Thus  there  exists a value K0  such that the trajectory through 
(ko, Kl) crosses  neither  locus  and  must  therefore  correspond  to  an 
equilibrium." 
This  is the essence  of  the  proof  of  theorem  2. INCREASING  RETURNS  1029 
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Fiora  3.-Geometry  of  the  competitive  equilibrium  for  example  1. The  line  LI  is 
defined  by the equation  XA  1/(8 -  o)k; t1 and  t  denote  representative  trajectories in 
the  phase  plane,  CE  denotes  the  competitive  equilibrium  trajectory,  which  stays 
everywhere  between  the  A0  a(nd  k  =  Oloci;  Xo denotes  the initial shadow  price of 
knowledge  corresponding  to the  initial stock of  knowledge  ko. 
In fact, the path resembles  a conventional  equilibrium  in which the 
trajectory remains between  the A =  0 and k =  0 loci as it converges  to 
a saddle  point,  although  here  it  is as  if  the  saddle  point  has  been 
moved  infinitely  far to the right.  Since  the optimal  trajectory cannot 
stop,  capital grows  without  bound.  Since  the  trajectory is downward 
sloping  and since consumption  is increasing  in k and decreasing  in X, 
it is easy to see that consumption  also grows without  bound.  Because 
of the difficulty of the algebra, it is not easy to describe the asymptotic 
rates of  growth. 
B.  Example  2 
Suppose  now that utility is linear,  U(c) =  c. In the algebra and in the 
phase  plane  for this case, we can ignore  the restriction  c  0  0 since it 
will not  be binding  in the  region  of  interest.  Maximizing  out  c from 
the Hamiltonian  h(k,  X, K, c) =  c +  Xkg((f -  c)/k) implies that c = / - 
tk(X5  3-  1). Thenf  -  c is positive  (hence  k is positive)  if and only  if 
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FIG. 4.-Geometry  of  the  competitive  equilibrium  for  example  2.  The  line  L2 is 
defined  by  an  equation  of  the  form  X =  Ak"'Y-';  t,  and  t2 denote  representative 
trajectories in the  phase  plane;  CE denotes  the competitive  equilibrium  trajectory that 
stays everywhere  between  L2 and A =  0; X0  denotes  the initial shadow  price of knowl- 
edge. 
In this example,  it is possible to put tighter bounds  on the behavior 
of  the  A  =  0  locus  and,  more  important,  on  the  behavior  of  the 
equilibrium  trajectory. As demonstrated  in the appendix  (available on 
request).  =  0 is upward  sloping  and behaves  asymptotically like the 
power  function  A =  Bkv+"  for some constant B. For this economy, 
the equilibrium  trajectory will lie above the A =  0 locus, so it is conve- 
nient  to define  an additional  curve  that will trap the equilibrium  tra- 
jectory  from  above.  For an appropriate  choice  of  the constant A, the 
line L2 defined  by A =  Akv+y-  1 will lie above A =  0 and will have the 
property  that trajectories  must cross  it from  below  (see fig. 4). Since 
trajectories  must  cross A =  0 from  above,  the  same  geometric  argu- 
ment  as  used  in  the  last  example  demonstrates  that  there  exists  a 
trajectory that remains  between  these  two lines. Consequently  it must 
also behave  asymptotically  like  kv+Y-  1. Since k(t) can grow  no  faster 
than eat, the product  K(t)k(t) will be bounded  along such a trajectory by 
a  function  of  the  form  eu(v+y)l.  Since  8  >  (v  +  y)x, this  trajectory 
satisfies  the  transversality  condition  and  corresponds  to  an  equilib- 
rium. 
Along  the  equilibrium  trajectory,  K behaves  asymptotically  like INCREASING  RETURNS  1031 
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FIG. 5.-Geometry  for the economy  in example  2 when an exogenous  increase of size 
A  in  the  stock  of  knowledge  is  known  to  occur  at  a  time  T  >  0.  The  equilibrium 
trajectory  moves  along  t,  until  time  T, at which  point  it is A  units  to the  left  of  the 
trajectory CE. At time T. the economy jumps  horizontally  to GE with the change  in the 
capital stock, but the  path for A(t) is continuous.  The  equilibrium  then  proceeds  along 
CE. ko denotes  the initial shadow price of knowledge  in the case in which the exogenous 
increase will take place; A0  denotes  the lower value that obtains in an economy  in which 
no exogenous  increase  will take place. 
kV  +-  1. Given the expression  noted  above for c in terms of A and k, c 
behaves  asvmptoticallv  like kv+y -  okl  +(.5)(v+y-  I)  and I  =f  -  b  e- 
haves like k'  +  (5)(v+Y  '1) Then  c, I, Clk, and I/k go to infinity with k. By 
the  assumptions  on  the  research  technology,  I/k  going  to  infinity 
implies  that  k/k approaches  its  upper  bound  a.  Consequently,  the 
percentage  rate of  growth  of  output  and  of  consumption  will be in- 
creasing,  both approaching  the asymptotic  upper  bound  ot(v +  -y). 
Because  the equilibrium  trajectory is upward sloping,  this economy 
will exhibit different  stability properties  from either  the conventional 
model  or the economy  with logarithmic  utility described  above.  Fig- 
ure 5 illustrates a standard exercise  in which a perfect-foresight  equi- 
librium is perturbed.  Suppose  that at time 0 it is known that the stock 
of knowledge  will undergo  an exogenous  increase of size A at time T 
and that no other  exogenous  changes  will occur.  Usual  arbitrage ar- 
guments  imply that the path for any price like X(t)  must be continuous 
at time  T. The  path  followed  by the  equilibrium  in the  phase  plane 1032  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
starts on  a trajectory  like t,  such  that at time  T it arrives at a point 
exactly  A units  to the  left  of  the  trajectory CE from  figure  4,  which 
would  have  been  the  equilibrium  in  the  absence  of  any  exogenous 
change  in k. As the economy  evolves,  it moves  along  tI then jumps  A 
units to the right  to the trajectory CE at time T. Since e-btx(t) can be 
interpreted  as a time 0 market price for knowledge,  a foreseen  future 
increase in the aggregate  stock of knowledge  causes a time 0 increase 
in the  price  for  knowledge  and  a consequent  increase  in the  rate of 
investment  in knowledge.  Because  of the increasing  returns,  the pri- 
vate response  to an aggregate  increase  in the stock of knowledge  will 
be to reinforce  its effects  rather than to dampen  them.  Since the rate 
of growth of the stock of knowledge  is increasing in the level, this kind 
of disturbance  causes the stock of knowledge  to be larger at all future 
dates. Moreover,  the magnitude  of the difference  will grow over time. 
Thus  small current  or anticipated  future  disturbances  can potentially 
have large,  permanent,  aggregate  effects. 
As a comparison  with the  first example  shows,  this result requires 
not  only  that  increasing  returns  be  present  but  also  that  marginal 
utility not decrease  too rapidly with the level of  per capita consump- 
tion.  If we had  restricted  attention  to the class of  bounded,  constant 
elasticity utility functions,  [cal  -0)  +  1]/(1 -  0) with 0 >  1, this phenom- 
enon  would  not  be apparent.  The  specific  example  here  uses  linear 
utility for convenience,  but similar results will hold  for constant  elas- 
ticity utility function [c('-)  -  1]/( 1 -  0) for values of 0 close enough 
to zero. 
C.  Example 3 
The  analysis of the previous  example  suggests  a simple  multicountry 
model with no tendency  toward convergence  in the level of per capita 
output.  Suppose  each  country  is modeled  as a separate  closed  econ- 
omy  of  the  type  in example  2.  Thus  no  trade  in goods  takes  place 
among  the  different  countries,  and  knowledge  in  one  country  has 
external  effects  only within that country.  Even if all countries  started 
out with the same initial stock of knowledge,  small disturbances  could 
create permanent  differences  in the level of  per capita output.  Since 
the rate of  growth  of  the stock of  knowledge  is increasing  over  time 
toward  an  asymptotic  upper  bound,  a smaller  country  s will always 
grow less rapidly than a larger country  1. Asymptotically,  the rates of 
growth  (k/k),  and (k/k)1  will both converge  to o,  but the ratios k/lk,  and 
c/ic  will be monotonically  increasing  over  time,  and  the  differences 
k1(t)  -  k,(t) and  c,(t) -  c,(t) will go to infinity. 
It  is  possible  to  weaken  the  sharp  separation  assumed  between 
countries in this discussion.  In particular, neither  the absence of trade INCREASING  RETURNS  1033 
in consumption  goods  and knowledge  nor the sharp restriction on the 
extent  of the externalities  is essential  for the divergence  noted  above. 
As  in  the  Arrow  (1962)  learning-by-doing  model,  suppose  that  all 
knowledge  is embodied  either  in physical capital or as human  capital. 
Thus  k denotes  a composite  good  composed  of both  knowledge  and 
some  kind of tangible  capital. In this embodied  form,  knowledge  can 
be freely  transported  between  two different  countries.  Suppose  fur- 
ther  that  the  external  effect  of  knowledge  embodied  in  capital  in 
place in one country extends  across its border but does so with dimin- 
ished intensity.  For example,  suppose  that output  of a representative 
firm in country  1 can be described  asf(k, K1, K2)  =  kV(K'  +  Kb), where 
k is the firm's stock of  the composite  good,  K1 and K2 are the aggre- 
gates in the two countries,  and the exponent  a on the domestic  aggre- 
gate K1 is strictly greater than the exponent  b on the foreign  aggregate 
K2.  Production  in  country  2  is  defined  symmetrically.  Then  for  a 
specific form of the research technology,  Romer (1983) shows that the 
key restriction  on the equilibrium  paths Sk1 and Sk2 in the two coun- 
tries  comes  from  the  equality  of  the  marginal  product  of  private 
knowledge  imposed  by the  free  mobility of  the composite  good  k: 
Dif(k1,  Ski, Sk2)  =  Dlf(k2,  Sk2, Skh).  (1) 
With  the  functional  form  given  above,  it  is  easy  to  verify  that,  in 
addition  to the symmetric  solution  kl  =  k2,  there exists an asymmetric 
solution.  In  that  solution,  if  k1 is larger  than  k2 and  growing  (e.g., 
country  1 is industrialized  and country  2 is not),  the  path for k2 that 
satisfies this equation  either  can  grow  at a rate slower  than  that for 
country  1 or may shrink,  exporting  the composite  good  to the  more 
developed  country. 12 
This  kind of  steady,  ongoing  "capital flight" or "brain drain" does 
not  require  any  fundamental  difference  between  the  two countries. 
They  have identical  technologies.  If we assume  that there  is perfect 
mobility in the composite  k, it can even take place when both countries 
start from  the  same  initial level of  k. If all agents  are convinced  that 
country 2 is destined  to be the slow-growing  country in an asymmetric 
equilibrium,  a discrete  amount  of  the composite  good  will jump  im- 
mediately  to country  1. Thereafter,  the two countries  will evolve  ac- 
cording  to  equation  (1),  with  country  2  growing  more  slowly  than 
country  1 or possibly even  shrinking. 
This  kind of  model  should  not be taken too literally. A more  real- 
istic model  would  need  to take account of other  factors of production 
with various degrees  of less than perfect  mobility. Nonetheless,  it does 
suggest  that  the  presence  of  increasing  returns  and  of  multiple 
12 Details are available in an app.  available from  the author. 1034  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
equilibria  can introduce  a degree  of  instability that is not  present  in 
conventional  models.  This  identifies  a second  sense  in  which  small 
disturbances  can have large effects.  In addition  to the multiplier-type 
effect  for a closed  economy  as described  in the last example,  a small 
disturbance  or a small change  in a policy  variable such  as a tax rate 
could  conceivably  have  a decisive  effect  on which of  several  possible 
equilibria  is attained. 
VII.  Conclusion 
Recent  discussions  of  growth  have  tended  not to emphasize  the role 
of  increasing  returns.  At least in part, this reflects the  absence  of  an 
empirically  relevant  model  with  increasing  returns  that exhibits  the 
rigor  and  simplicity  of  the  model  developed  by Ramsey,  Cass, and 
Koopmans.  Early  attempts  at  such  a  model  were  seriously  under- 
mined  by the loose  treatment  of specialization  as a form of increasing 
returns  with  external  effects.  More  recent  attempts  by  Arrow, 
Levhari, and Sheshinski  were  limited  by their dependence  on exoge- 
nously  specified  population  growth  and  by the  implausible  implica- 
tion that the rate of  growth  of  per capita income  should  be a mono- 
tonically  increasing  function  of  the  rate  of  population  growth. 
Incomplete  models  that took the rate of technological  change  as exog- 
enously  specified  or that made it endogenous  in a descriptive  fashion 
could  address  neither  welfare  implications  nor  positive  implications 
like  the  slowing  of  growth  rates  or  the  convergence  of  per  capita 
output. 
The  model  developed  here  goes  part way toward  filling this theo- 
retical gap. For analytical convenience,  it is limited to a case that is the 
polar opposite  of  the usual  model  with endogenous  accumulation  of 
physical  capital  and  no  accumulation  of  knowledge.  But  once  the 
operation  of  the  basic model  is clear, it is straightforward  to include 
other  state variables. The  implications  for a model  with both increas- 
ing marginal productivity  of knowledge  and decreasing  marginal pro- 
ductivity of physical capital can easily be derived  using the framework 
outlined  here;  however,  the geometric  analysis using the phase plane 
is  impossible  with  more  than  one  state  variable,  and  numerical 
methods  for solving  dynamic  equation  systems must be used. 13 Since 
the model  here can be interpreted  as the special case of the two-state- 
variable  model  in  which  knowledge  and  capital  are  used  in  fixed 
13  For  an  example  of  this  kind  of  numerical  analysis  in  a  model  with  a  stock  of 
knowledge  and a stock of an exhaustible  resource,  see Romer and Sasaki (1985).  As in 
the  growth  model,  increasing  returns  associated  with knowledge  can reverse  conven- 
tional  presumptions;  in  particular,  exhaustible  resource  prices  can  be  monotonically 
decreasing  for all time. INCREASING  RETURNS  1035 
proportions,  this  kind  of  extension  can  only  increase  the  range  of 
possible equilibrium  outcomes. 
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